

# Conceptual distinctions in a fuzzy lexicon within the mind/brain

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## Abstract

*The purpose of this article is exploring the matter of conceptual distinctions, between and among lexical units within a fuzzy lexicon in the mind/brain. It was found conceptual distinctions for that purpose, can be found in the traditional and discrete view of lexicon, by adding one more connection to the mechanism.*

**Keywords:** *Conceptual distinctions, discrete lexicon, fuzzy lexicon, mind/brain.*

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Linguistics in the last decades has progressed quite a good deal, especially with some new insights based of Chomskian linguistics. Our research aims at providing with additional insights in this sub-field, and this article is the third one following this sub-line of research, dealing with the fuzzy/discrete state of lexicon within the mind/brain. As we have mentioned earlier, the aim of this article is exploring the matter of conceptual distinctions, between and among lexical units within a fuzzy lexicon, in the mind/brain. Next sections will develop these ideas further.

## II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### 2.1 Lexicon and fuzzy/discrete lexicon

Lexicon (in the mind/brain for that matter) can be conceived as a dynamic and multifaceted system, in charge of storing word knowledge. As new words are learned and existing knowledge refined, it is constantly changing (Alvarez, 2025; Tsouri Bentsouri & Larabi, 2025). Additionally, lexicon is both discrete and fuzzy (Rothe et al, 2016; Haines, 2021; Alvarez, 2019, 2026) and words in a lexicon can combine to form phrases and sentences as well (Chomsky, 1957).

### 2.2 Conceptual distinction

Conceptual distinction involves a clear differentiation between ideas or concepts. This differentiation clarifies meaning, and promotes understanding by establishing precise boundaries (Wisdom Library, 2026). For Descartes, a conceptual distinction was one created by the mind's activity (Skirry, 2004) and this idea has been addressed by intellectuals like Noam Chomsky, who refers to the conceptual distinction between mysteries and problems, in one of his interviews (Chomsky's Philosophy, 2014).

## III. DISCUSSION

Before the point that there has to be a conceptual distinction between and among lexical units in the lexicon within the mind/brain ((Tsouri Bentsouri & Larabi, 2025; Wisdom Library, 2026), we have to consider the following: If some words in the lexicon within the mind/brain hold obscure meanings, that creates the need to make the lexicon fuzzy, so as to absorb in a way, the "obscurity" of these words in the general set of words within the mind/brain (Alvarez, 2025; Tsouri Bentsouri & Larabi, 2025). However, as we have lately noticed, this fuzzy state of the lexicon cannot stay like that forever. If it is true that the lexicon within the mind/brain may absorb the obscurity of these obscure words, then the lexicon itself gets contaminated so to speak, by this added "obscurity", even if it is far less dark than in the words holding obscure meanings.

Therefore it is necessary to create, or identify, the conceptual distinctions between and among the lexical units in the lexicon within the mind/brain, no matter if this distinction takes place between words having obscure meanings and words that do not. This step is necessary in order to organize, order and separate the words holding obscure meanings, from those that do not (Alvarez, 2025; Tsouri Bentsouri & Larabi, 2025; Wisdom Library, 2026). We also realize that the idea of conceptual distinction between and among units within

the lexicon, is key for an optimal visualization and application of the lexicon within the mind/brain, to language use. Most likely, the lexicon being fuzzy is a provisional state and part of the general mechanism.

If what is mentioned above is true, we need to create or identify conceptual distinctions between and among lexical units with their corresponding meanings, within the lexicon. The lexicon is not a mass of unintelligible information we cannot have access to, for that matter. Rather, it seems that a lexical set is at some point in a fuzzy state, waiting for conceptual distinctions to be performed, by creating or identifying the corresponding discrete conceptual categories, in the lexicon within the mind/brain. These will allow for each (or most) word(s) in the lexicon, to have a discretely distinct meaning within it. For example, the conceptual distinction between mysteries and problems follows this pattern (Chomsky's Philosophy, 2014).

As we have said, establishing internally conceptual distinctions within the lexicon, is a necessary step to avoid a partial but universal contamination of it. That leads to the question of how we can perform that task and what steps have to be carried out. However, maybe any new procedure from now on is a useless step, given the fact the conceptual distinctions between and among words within lexicon in the mind/brain, were basically already there before our speculations on the fuzzy nature of lexicon really began (Alvarez, 2019, 2025). That leads to the consideration that maybe, we only need to go back to the traditional, discrete view of lexicon within the mind/brain, to really get an idea of the conceptual distinctions a lexicon needs in order to be an optimal system, of words that combine to form phrases and sentences (Chomsky, 1957; Tsouri Bentsouri & Larabi, 2025) and beyond.

From now we can add one more connection to the whole circuit of fuzziness within the lexicon in the mind/brain, according to what we have explored in previous research. In this way, we set the mechanism to go back to its pre-initial state, just before this sub-line of research really began, and add the corresponding connection to it. In that way we can "discard" this whole sub-line of research and consider it just as a provisional state of a potential and broader computational mechanism, at best, in which lexicon comes back to its original discrete state (Rothe et al, 2016; Haines, 2021). However, we believe that we can continue working on the ideas we have presented through this article and previous work (Alvarez, 2025, 2026), in the future.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Through this article we explored the matter of conceptual distinctions, between and among lexical units within a fuzzy lexicon in the mind/brain. It was found conceptual distinctions can be reached by going back to the traditional and discrete view of lexicon in the mind/brain. We carry out this comeback by proposing there is an additional connection in the internal mechanism, forming an additional loop within the mechanism.

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